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I. Introduction: Definitions and Terms
Like all major actors on the world stage, the United States exerts 
international power and influence through the sale of weapons. Indeed, 
since World War II American arms transfers have played a critical role in 
determining the outcomes of various regional conflicts and in maintaining 
the global balance of power. Yet, as the volume of arms sales grew, the ability 
of the U.S. government to direct and control them correspondingly declined. 
In large part, this loss of control reflects the rise of private arms dealers and 
the parallel expansion of clandestine trading networks. This paper will 
examine the rapid expansion of the black market in American weapons 
during the 1980s, its effects on U.S. national security, as well as the prospects 
for curbing illegal arms sales through domestic and international reforms.
Let us begin by determining what constitutes illegal arms sales. Professor 
Michael Klare of the University of New Hampshire offers the following 
definition: "Black market sales encompass arms transfers that are knowingly 
conducted in violation of established law and procedure, and that entail a 
high risk of apprehension and punishment for those caught engaging in such 
transactions."* In the United States, black market arms sales often include 
the resale of weapons stolen from government arsenals. They also include 
the transfer of weapons improperly obtained from legitimate dealers and 
defense contractors.
* Klare, Michael T. ’’Secret Operatives, Clandestine Trades: The Thriving 
Black Market For Weapons." The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 
1988, p. 18.
In addition to these explicitly illegal transactions, a parallel trade has 
developed on the fringe of the law -the so-called "gray market" in American 
weapons. The gray market typically involves products with both civilian and 
military applications. Such dual-use items include communication and 
transport equipment. For example, a country ineligible to import a particular 
type of computer from the United States for military purposes may purchase 
the item under the pretext that it will be used only for educational research. 
Gray markets also develop when government oversight agencies bend 
existing export rules or interpret them loosely, depending on the 
circumstances at hand. The potential for abuse is readily apparent.
Although the black and gray markets in American weapons overlap to a 
considerable extent, this paper will focus primarily on black market sales, i.e. 
those transactions which take place in clear violation of existing laws. While 
gray market sales are by no means insignificant, they are, by definition, much 
more difficult to identify and quantify. What little concrete data on the illegal 
sate of American weapons are available relate almost exclusively to black 
market activities.
II. Dimensions of the Black Market in American Weapons
Before examining the effects of the illegal trade in American arms, we 
must first determine its parameters. How large is the market? What kinds of 
weapons are involved? Who are the arms smugglers, and what are their 
motives? Who purchases American weapons illegally, and how do they 
obtain them? The answers to these questions reveal a highly-developed, 
clandestine trading system in American weaponry which is merely one 
component of an international arms-smuggling network.
Calculating size of the black market in American weapons is largely a 
matter of guess-work. As with any illegal activity, the few available statistics 
measure only the number of cases which have been reported, not the full 
extent of the market. The U.S. Customs Service compiles the most 
comprehensive statistics on black market arms transfers which are available 
under the Freedom of Information Act. From fiscal year 1982 through fiscal 
year 1988, the Customs Service reported 6,625 seizures of illegal arms exports 
valued at $460.9 million.2
The guess-work comes in determining what percent of the total market in 
illegal American arms is intercepted by the Customs Service. If the rate of 
interception is comparable to that for illegal drugs, the Customs Service data 
would account for only ten percent of the total market. Assuming a ten 
percent interception rate, the market value of illegal American arms sales, 
based on Customs Service data, totaled $4.6 billion from 1982 through 1988, an
2 Laurance, Edward J. ‘The New Gunrunning." Orhis, Spring 1989, p. 228.
See Appendix A for a reprint of the Customs Service data.
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average of more than $650 million per year. Measuring the world market in 
illegal arms is equally hazardous. Michael Klare estimates its total value at
$5-10 billion annually.3
¥
Whatever the actual stee of the illegal market in American arms, it is vital 
to determine what types of weapons are involved. Again, accurate statistics 
are scarce. The U.S. Department of Justice has provided a list of ’significant 
export control cases” from 1981 through 1988, which breaks down arms export 
violations into five broad categories: small arms, equipment destined for 
embargoed nations, technology, support materials, and major weapons
svstems.4
Small arms and ammunition account for approximately 11 percent of the 
Justice Department s prosecutions. Nevertheless, they probably constitute a 
substantially greater share of the total volume of illegal arms shipments, 
simply because they are relatively easy to conceal and the smugglers are less 
likely to be caught. While small arms transfers are substantial in terms of 
sheer numbers, the types of weapons involved rarely pose a significant threat 
to American national security. For this reason, illegal shipments of small 
arms will not be considered in great detail in this paper.
Arms shipments to embargoed countries and illegal technology transfers 
together account for 43 percent of the Justice Department s prosecutions.
These two phenomena are closely related. Embargo cases involve the transfer 
of weapons or dual-use items to states like South Africa and Chile. Similarly,
3 Klare, 1988, p. 16.
4 Laurance, p. 228. See Appendix B for a reprint of the justice Department 
figures.
''technology cases include violations of the strategic embargo against the Soviet 
Union and other East Bloc nations. Both types of smuggling undermine 
American policies toward specific countries or regions, though oftentimes 
such policies address separate issues like nuclear proliferation.
This paper will focus primarily on the two remaining types of arms 
smuggling cases: support material and major weapons systems The Justice 
Department reports that just under one-third (31 percent) of its prosecutions 
involve the smuggling of spare parts ?nd other support material. The market 
for spare pa ts has exploded during the past decade, fueled in part by the 
epidemic of conventional wars in the Third World. Needless to sav, the 
depletion of spare part stockpiles due to smuggling seriously threatens 
American national security.
Of even greater concern is the smuggling of major weapons systems, 
which account for 15 percent of Justice Department prosecutions. As we will 
see, arms traffickers have attempted to smuggle such sensitive items as 
fighter aircraft, helicopters, transport planes, main battle tanks, and various 
kinds of missiles over the past decade. While these types of weapons 
naturally attract the lion’s share of media attention, they are far more likely to 
be intercepted prior to leaving the country. Nevertheless, those major 
weapons systems which are illegally exported clearly jeopardize U.S. security 
interests.
What kind of people smuggle American arms abroad? Broadly speaking 
there are two categories of arms smugglers: those who finance and facilitate 
the flow of arms, and their accomplices who actually steal and transport the 
weapons. Sadly, U.S. citizens account for the majority of both types of
smugglers. Civilian employees of American military bases steal weapons and 
spare parts from government arsenals, while unscrupulous businessmen 
purchase them and ship them abroad, usually at astronomical mark-ups. 
Foreign nationals also play a key ro! in the trade. Some operate within the 
U.S., but most prefer the safety of an international smuggling center like 
London or Cyprus. Foreign middlemen often provide transport for weapons 
once they have left the United States.
Greed and financial gain motivate most arms traffickers, but factors like 
ethnicity and ideology also play a role. For example, Customs Service officials 
have implicated Iranian expatriates in a number of schemes to smuggle 
American weapons and spare parts to Iran during its bloody, eight-year war 
with Iraq. A Los Angeles Times investigation revealed that Iranian agents 
routinely pressured and intimidated Iranian citizens living abroad into 
smuggling for their homeland. Such pressures included everything from 
patriotic appeals to threats against family members still residing in Iran.1'
Loyalty to another state or cause is by no means limited to foreigners. For 
example, many Irish-Americans opposed to British rule in Ulster donate 
money to NORAID, an organization which funds the political arm of the 
terrorist Irish Republican Army. In June of 1986 an American couple was 
apprehended in France while attempting to smuggle surface to air missiles to 
the to the Irish National Liberation Army, an IRA splinter group.** Cuban- 
Americans, inspired by their antipathy toward Fidel Castro, helped supply 56
5 Rempel, William C. and Green, Larry "London Center of Iran Arms 
Smuggling." The Los Angeles Times, September 3, 1985, p. 1 and 18.
6 The Washington Post, June 13, 1986, p. 24.
black market weapons to the Nicaraguan contra rebels/ They were 
instrumental in maintaining the flow of small arms and ammunition after 
American military aid was cut off.
Smugglers of American arms rely on two key sources of supply: loosely- 
guarded military storehouses and the open market.
Some weapons and most spare parts are stolen directly from Department 
of Defense warehouses, both in the United States and abroad. In 1986 the 
General Accounting Office reviewed 347 reports written by various military 
auditing agencies. From these reports, the GAO concluded that security is 
sufficiently lax to permit easy penetration of the Pentagon supply system from 
the outside. In one particularly damning report, the Inspector General for the 
Army admitted that his office is incapable of determining how much 
ammunition and explosives are stolen from the Army each year.7 8 
Altogether, the Pentagon estimates that it looses or misplaces no less than $1 
billion worth of equipment annually due to antiquated computers and 
unprofessional accounting practices.9 Determining what percent of this 
equipment is actually stolen from the outside is anyone’s guess.
Internal security poses an equally vexing problem for the Pentagon. In its 
1986 survey, the General Accounting Office found numerous instances of 
employee theft in all branches of the armed forces. While most internal theft 
involves clothing, medical supplies and other non-lethal items, at least some
7 Klare, 1988, p. 19.
8 U.S. General Accounting Office. Problems in Accountability uml Security 
of DOD Supply Inventories, Report No. NSIAD-86-106BR, May 23, 1986.
9 Brinkley, Joel. ’’Black Market Sales Rise in Arms Stolen From U.S.
Military Bases.” The New York Times, September 29, 1985, p. 30
of it can be attributed to arms smuggling, For example, in l ^  the Justice 
Department convicted Sgt. Keith Anderson of stealing C-4 plastic explosives 
from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Anderson explained that he obtained the 
explosives by checking them out for a training exercise JO Officials at Fort 
Bragg remained oblivious to the smuggling of these and other items, 
including land mines and artillery, until civilian authorities uncovered the 
thefts.
Arms smugglers need not limit themselves to Pentagon warehouses 
when stealing American weapons; scores of foreign countries also stockpile 
American-made military equipment. Consequently, many arms smugglers 
prefer to steal American weapons from foreign depots and warehouses. 
Israel, which owns one of the largest overseas arsenals of American-made 
arms, is a favorite target of black marketeers. Normally, the resale of such 
weapons to a third party requires the permission of both the Israeli and 
American governments. However, smugglers can avoid this rule by 
presenting falsified resale certificates to customs agents.*1
The other main source of supply for arms smugglers is the open market. 
In many instances, the easiest way for a smuggler to obtain weapons is to 
purchase them from middlemen who deal directly with the manufacturers. 
Legitimate arms dealers simply buy weapons up front, export them under a 
false pretext, and later deliver them to their illegal clients. In recent years, 
many defense contractors have suffered from slumping Third World
iO Ibid. p. 30
H Lachica, Eduardo. "U.S. Charges 17 in Conspiracy to Send $2 billion in 
Aircraft, Weapons to Iran.” The Wall Street journal, April 23, 1986, p. 2.
demand, increased international competition, and Western-imposed arms 
embargoes. 12 As a result, some financially-troubled manufacturers are 
willing to sell excess inventory to unscrupulous middlemen and turn a blind 
eye to subsequent resales of their products on the black market.
The principal purchasers of illegal weapons are the so-called "pariah 
states," subject to American as well as international arms embargoes. Among 
them are the countries identified by the State Department as supporting 
international terrorism: Iran, Libya, Syria, Cuba, \orth Korea, and South 
Yemen. Congress formally banned the sale of arms to terrorist states in 
1986.13 Primarily because of its lengthy war with neighboring Iraq, Iran was 
by far the most frequent illegal recipient of American military hardware 
during the past decade. South Africa also trades on the black market, but 
unlike other outcast nations, it does so primarily to obtain blueprints and 
technology for developing its own weapons.
Non-governmental purchasers of illegal arms include terrorists 
organizations, guerilla armies, and other insurgent groups. For obvious 
reasons, such groups cannot buy arms on the open market and must resort to 
clandestine sources to satisfy their needs.
12 Klare, 1988, p. 16.
13 Felton, John. "House Panel Moving to Plug Loopholes Thai Permitted 
U.S. Arms Sales to Iran." Congressional Quarterly, April 23, 1988, p. 1077.
HI. The Process of Arms Smuggling
Analysts divide the black market in American arms into two distinct 
categories: the resale of stolen weapons, and the export of weapons or dual- 
use items under quasi-legal pretexts.
As we have seen, most stolen weapons and equipment are pilfered from 
loosely-guarded government warehouses. Smugglers typically flv small 
quantities of stolen weapons out of the country in private aircraft, following 
the drug-trafficking model. Surprisingly, some smugglers also employ 
commercial transport, using little more than a mislabeled shipping container 
to disguise stolen weapons. Obviously this technique works best with 
relatively inconspicuous contraband like spare parts. Whatever mode of 
transit they choose, arms traffickers always channel stolen weapons through a 
maze of intermediate destinations and bogus trading companies in order to 
avoid detection.
The notorious F-14 parts smuggling ring is a prime example of the traffic 
in stolen weapons and equipment. In order to obtain critical spare parts for 
Iran's air force, Iranian businessman Said Inanlou set up a dummy trading 
corporation in London. Inanlou recruited an American accomplice, Franklin 
Aguslin, with personal contacts in the San Diego naval community. Offering 
cash payoffs provided by Inanlou, Aguslin established a ring of civilian 
employees willing to steal F-14 parts from the local naval warehouse. 
Oftentimes, the warehouse workers "simply took the parts off the shelf and 
carried them home at the end of the day."!4
14 Klare, 1988, p. 22.
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Agustin collected the stolen F-14 components, labeled them as "auto 
parts,” and shipped them via commercial transport to Inanlou’s company in 
London. Inanlou’s employees then repackaged the parts before transporting 
them to Iran. San Diego law enforcement officials cracked the smuggling ring 
in the summer of 1986, much to the chagrin of U S. Navy supply managers 
who failed to recognize the threat to their spare parts stockpiles. Warehouse 
supervisors concentrated on protecting civilian-oriented goods like clothing 
and pocket knives, assuming there was no black market for F-14 parts. 15 The 
Navy eventually charged seven individuals with participating in the 
smuggling ring, including an enlisted seaman assigned to the aircraft carrier 
Kitty Hawk.
’ Legally” purchased weapons follow a slightly different pattern from those 
which are stolen. Private arms dealers and other middlemen serve as the 
conduit between American defense contractors and illegal purchasers like 
Iran. Middlemen buy weapons and dual-use items directly from the 
manufacturer under a false, but apparently legal, pretext The easiest method 
is to obtain a fraudulent ’’end-user certificate” to convince the Customs 
Service that the weapons will be shipped to a legal destination. Middlemen 
prefer to export the weapons through trading companies based in friendly 
nations like Britain or Japan, which have few restrictions on the purchase 
American armaments. Eventually, the weapons are routed to the real 
purchaser via circuitous paths. The arms merchants need never inform the
15 Shaw, Gaylord and Bunting, Glenn F, Pentagon Supply System:
America’s Soft Underbelly?” The Los Angeles Times, September 1, 1985,
pp 1,20*22.
manufacturer of the weapons’ ultimate destination, and some unscrupulous 
contractors undoubtedly prefer not to know.
The 1985 Hughes helicopter case illustrates how legally exported military 
equipment ends up in the wrong hands. From 1983 to 1985, West German 
businessman Kurt Behrens purchased 82 civilian helicopters from Hughes 
Aircraft through his legitimate trading company, Delta-Avia Fluggerate. 
Because the helicopters in question were cosily convertible to military uses, 
U.S. law prohibited them from being exported to unfriendly countries. 
Accordingly, Behrens shipped small batches of the helicopters to such 
innocuous initial destinations as Japan, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Later, 
they were diverted to North Korea. The Commerce Department uncovered 
one instance in which Behrens shipped 15 helicopters to Antwerp, then 
trucked them to Rotterdam, where they were placed on a Soviet freighter 
bound for Hong Kong. The Soviets secretly delivered the helicopters to North 
Korea. ^
Five American middlemen employed a similar strategy when smuggling 
Lockheed transport planes to Libya in 1986. A pair of Libyan nationals in 
West Germany first contacted the Americans in 1983 in hopes of obtaining 
battle gear. When this deal collapsed, the Libyans requested transport aircraft 
insLad, The American middlemen purchased two Lockheed L-100-30 model 
transport planes in the name of a West German trading company set up by 
the two Libyan agents. Lockheed officials were told the planes would be 
delivered to Bolivia. In fact, the middlemen shipped the planes from the
The New York Times, February 3, 1985, p. 1.
factory in Marietta, Georgia, to Newfoundland, France, and eventually to
Tripoli. 17
Foreign ports provide key transport hubs for the illegal trade in American 
arms. Without these secure bases from which to buy and ship weapons, arms 
merchants and other middlemen could not function.
For example, during the Iran-lraq war London served as the primary 
conduit for Iranian arms smuggling. Home to a large population of Iranian 
expatriates and located halfway between Washington and Teheran, the 
British capital provided the ideal base for Iranian agents. Moreover, London 
trading companies, like Swiss banks, still maintain a long-standing tradition 
of secrecy and discretion, two qualities cherished by arms dealers.
However, Londons most important advantages were British export and 
customs laws, which differ considerably from those of the United States. 
American officials typically indict suspected arms traffickers on looselv- 
defined conspiracy charges. Unlike the U.S., Britain does not have a broad 
conspiracy law, and British officials refuse to extradite citizens or residents of 
Britain for crimes not recognized under British law.W American prosecutors 
also were frustrated bv the fact that Britain refused to prohibit the sale of spare 
parts to Iran, even though it did not allow Iran to purchase new weapons 
from British firms. Despite American pressure, the British government 
generally tolerated spare parts shipments, provided they did not reach Iran 
directly from British territoryJ9
17 The New York Times, July 24, 1986, p. 17 
Rempel and Green, p. 18.
I9 The Economist. September 19, 1987, p. 49.
Cyprus and Bulgaria also served as key arms smuggling tenters during the 
1980s. In both countries/ the illegal arms market was clostlv linked with the 
international narcotics trade.
Torn by civil war and a partial Turkish occupation, Cyprus sits at a 
strategic crossroads in the eastern Mediterranean. The island s proximity to 
the Middle Fast makes it an ideal stagine ground and meeting place for 
smugglers of all types. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration officials 
believe that Lebanese citizens smuggle heroin and hashish grown in the 
Bekka Valley to the West through Cyprus. The proceeds go to buy black- 
market armaments for Lebanon’s competing guerilla factions. Former Lt.
Col. Oliver North took advantage of Cyprus’s location when he negotiated 
the American arms-for-hostages deal with Iran. North used the island as a 
transit link between Washington and Beirut during several of his secret 
missions.
Bulgaria occupies the center of the principle land route connecting Furope 
and the Middle East. Like Cyprus, the Bulgarian capital of Sofia attracts a 
cosmopolitan crowd, including many smugglers. During the early 1980s SofD 
developed a reputation as the principle distribution point for the shipment o! 
black-market arms to terrorist organizations in the Middle Fast and Western 
Europe.21 Many, but bv no means all, of these weapons were of Fast 
European origin. In addition, narcotics traffickers made Sofia their 
headquarters for smuggling heroin into West Germany, Europe’s largest
20 Tyler, Patrick E. ’’Smugglers, Ciunrunners, Spies Cross Paths in Cyprus.'
The Washington Post, March 12, 1987, p. 36.
21 Kamm, Henry. "Plot on Pope Aside, Bulgaria’s Reputation Rests on 
Smuggling.’’ The Neiv York Times, January 28, 1983, pp 1, 3.
heroin market. Presumably Bulgaria’s communist leadership tolerated, if not 
actively encouraged, these illicit activities to the extent that they undermined 
Western interests. Whether or not a democratic Bulgaria will continue as a 
center for smuggling remains to be seen.
IV. The State of the Trade: Why Have Illegal Arms Sales 
Grown Over the Past Decade?
For a variety of reason1;, arms smuggling and arms smugglers have 
prospered throughout the 1980s. At first glance, one might blame the increase 
in arms trafficking on isolated events like the Iran-lraq war. While such 
conflicts unquestionably aggravate the problem, institutional factors also are 
at work. This combination of short-term events and long-term trends 
suggests that illegal arms sales will continue to plague the United States and 
the rest of the world community for the foreseeable future.
Perhaps the greatest stimulus for the illegal arms market in recent years 
has come from a series of conventional conflicts in the Third World. During 
the 1980s, protracted conventional wars have raged in Lebanon, Afghanistan, 
Central America, the Persian Gulf, and various parts of Africa. According to 
Michael Klare, "Each of these conflicts generated a significant demand for 
arms and ammunition that could not always be met through normal military
channels."22
Of these regional conflicts, the lran-lraq war did the most to boost illegal 
American arms sales. Under the Shah, Iran acquired a $17 billion cornucopia 
of American military hardware, including 80 F-14 fighter aircraft.23 When 
the Shah fell, American military aid came to an abrupt halt, leaving the new 
government bereft of the requisite parts and equipment needed to maintain
22 Klare, Michael. "Deadly Convergence: The Perils of the Arms Trade."
World Policy Journal, Winter 1988-1989, p. 149.
23 Shaw, Gaylord, and Rempel, William C. "Billion-Dollar Iran Arms Search 
Spans U.S., Globe." The Los Angeles Times, August 4,1985, p. 14.
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the sophisticated weaponry in its arsenal. After the outbreak of war with Iraq 
in 1980, Iran turned in desperation to the black market to meet its spare parts 
needs.
Iran's black market activities stand out for two reasons: the sheer number 
of weapons involved, and the huge amounts of money Iran was willing to 
pay for them. Operating mainly out of London, Iranian agents scoured the 
globe for all types of conventional armaments. Among the American 
equipment successfully smuggled to Iran were spare parts for howitzers and 
combat tanks, as well as components for the F-4, F-5, and F-14 fighter jets. 
Unsuccessful smuggling attempts included such items as infrared night- 
vision glasses and protective suits for use in chemical warfare.24 in 1986, the 
Customs Service cracked a smuggling ring which plotted to ship $2 billion 
worth of American arms to Teheran. The U S. District Attorney for New 
York described the ring's shopping list as "mind-boggling": 18 F-4 jet fighters, 
five Hercules transport planes, 46 Skyhawk fighter bombers, more than 1,000 
guided missiles, and 3,750 anti-tank missiles.25
Initially, at least, Iran spared no expense in its attempts to procure 
American weapons. Surviving records of individual purchase orders run 
into the hundreds of millions of dollars. According to The Los Angeles 
Times, "tape-recorded meetings with Iranian agents show them boasting 
casually about having access to $500 million each for different groups of arms 
purchases. "26 In many cases the commissions on such orders were so large
24 Ibid., p. 14.
25 Lachica, Eduardo, April 23,1986, p. 2.
26 Shaw and Rem pel, August 4,1985, p. 14.
that Iran had to pay its Western accomplices with discounted crude oil from 
the Iranian National Oil Company. Such hefty commissions reflect the 
astronomical mark-ups demanded by the arms dealers, often 1,000 percent or 
more for some especially scarce items. As its resources dwindled, Iran began 
to approach American contractors directly in the hope that they would 
smuggle their products for only 100 to 200 percent more than the retail 
priced7
Another regional conflict which increased black market sales of American 
weapons is the decade-long war in Afghanistan. U.S. military aid to the 
Mujahedeen guerillas, particularly in the form of Stinger surface-to-air 
missiles, helped to turn the war into a stalemate and convince the Soviet 
Union to withdraw its troops. In retrospect, however, the United States may 
regret sending sophisticated Stingers to guerillas who routinely barter on the 
black market. Some of the missiles already have leaked out of Afghanistan; in 
1987 Iran reportedly paid Afghan dealers $100,000 apiece for spare Stingers^*
A second catalyst for black market arms sales in the 1980s has been the 
Third World debt crisis. Nations whose oil revenues plummeted during the 
middle of the decade no longer can afford to purchase costly new weaponry 
from American defense contractors. Consequently, legal exports of American 
weapons were cut in half between 1983 and 1986.29 Many developing 
countries made do with the weapons they already had, while others bought
27 Hughes, David. "U.S. Uncovers Extensive Efforts to Procure Weapons for
Iran.” Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 1, 1988, p. 86.
28 The Economist, December 17, 1988, p. 44.
29 Grier, Peter. MU.S. Arms Exports Show Sharp Decline.” The Christian
Science Monitor, March 22, 1988, p. 1.
second-hand equipment through the black market or other unofficial 
channels. As Third World governments try to stretch the life-spans of their 
existing military hardware, the demand for black-market spare parts and 
other support equipment has skyrocketed. One senior Pentagon manager 
explained, "We’ve got a situation that we've never had before, in that things 
like F-14 parts, [and] Phoenix missile parts had no real appeal for criminals up 
until the last few years..."30
Even when developing nations do purchase new weapons, they are likely 
to demand that the price be offset by the supplier. Offsets allow purchasers to 
reduce the hard currency price of a weapon system in exchange for various 
concessions. They include a Byzantine array of indirect compensation, 
technology transfers, and even barter arrangements. According to Stephanie 
Neuman, developing nations are now almost as likely as our Western allies 
to demand price offsets when purchasing American weapons.31 However, 
the U.S. government refuses to offset prices on bilateral arms sales with other 
governments. Consequently, American manufacturers must negotiate their 
own offsets directly with foreign officials. The sheer complexity of these offset 
arrangements increases the scope for corruption and abuse at every level.
As result of these trends, bilateral weapons transfers, conducted directly 
between one government and another, no longer dominate the arms trade as 
they did in years past. The decline of the bilateral arms market parallels a vast 
expansion in the number of private arms bazaars and exhibitions. These fairs
30 Shaw and Bunting, p. 21.
31 Neuman, Stephanie C. ’’Coproduction, Countertrade, and Barter: Offsets 
in the International Arms Market." Orbis, Spring, 1985, p. 200-201.
provide manufacturers and their potential clients with a confidential 
atmosphere in which to mingle and bargain, in addition, arms bazaars 
magnify and legitimize the role of middlemen, many of whom dabble in 
smuggling the side.32 The net result is a boost for "alternative" suppliers 
operating on the margins of the law.
Finally, the black market in weapons has grown in tandem with the illegal 
drug trade. Over the past two decades, narcotics smugglers have developed a 
fast, efficient transport network to distribute their contraband worldwide. 
More importantly, the major drug cartels have the financial capacity to 
smuggle large quantities of weapons and ship them to clients who prefer to 
make black market purchases.33 Arms smugglers increasingly have taken 
advantage of this clandestine trading system. Therefore, the line separating 
illegal arms sales from the narcotics trade has blurred to a greater extent than 
ever before.
Colombia's Medellin cartel epitomizes the convergence of drug trafficking 
and gunrunning. In order to intimidate and immobilize the the Colombian 
government, leaders of the cartel purchased stolen guns and ammunition 
from the United States. Not surprisingly, the cartel paid its American 
suppliers with Colombian cocaine, using Mexico as the conduit for this two- 
way trading system. With the assistance of the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Mexican authorities launched a crackdown in February of 
1988. They seized more than 360 AK-47 assault rifles, over 145,000 rounds of 
ammunition, and an variety drugs and other weapons from warehouses
32 Laurance, p. 231.
33 Laurance, p. 231.
along the U.S./Mexico border.34 The dual nature of the Medellin cartel 
underscores the extent to which the illegal arms trade has become an 
international epidemic.
Another measure of the black market s global impact is its capacity to
corrupt governments. While the Iran-contra scandal stands out in American
minds, foreign officials also have succumbed to the lure of the illegal arms
market. In France, the chairman of the l.uchaire company implicated Charles
Mernu, a former Socialist defense minister, in a scheme to export munitions
to Iran. Despite the official French embargo, Luchaire exported half a million
artillery shells to Iran between 1983 and 1986, allegedly with the full
knowledge and approval of Hernu and President Mitterand According to the
chairman of Luchaire, 1 lernu accepted as much as 8500,000 in kickbacks, some
of which was diverted to Socialist Party coffers.35*
Arms scandals even plague Sweden, a neutral nation which prohibits the 
sale of weapons to countries that are at war or are located in "zones of 
conflict" like the Middle Fast. In 1986, Bofors, Sweden's largest defense 
contractor, admitted that it illegally shipped guided missiles to Bahrain in 
1978. However, former Bofors President Martin Ardbo claimed the Swedish 
government fully approved of this sak\36 A government spokesman denied 
Ardbo's allegations, but the subsequent suicide of the man in charge of 
regulating Swedish arms sales added fuel to the charges of official corruption.
34 Branigan, William. "Mexico Cracks Major Arms, Drug-Trafficking Ring. 
The Washington Post, February 26, 1988, p. 25.
35 Markham, James M. "Arms Scandal Puts Mitterand on Defensive The 
New York Times, November 8, 1987, p. 5.
36 Echikson, William. "Swedes Grapple With Dilemma of Talking Peace, 
Selling Arms." The Christian Science Monitor, September 3, 1987, p. 9.
Meanwhile, the Swedish press reported that Bofors may have smuggled arms 
to Oman, Libya, and Iran, and may have bribed the Indian government to 
win a contract for howitzers.
Bofors executives defended their actions as a matter of economic survival. 
Like all manufacturers, arms makers need to maintain a minimum level of 
production to make a profit. Given the smell domestic market for 
armaments, Swedish firms must export their surplus weaponry. These 
economies of scale create a catch-22 for the Swedish government: if Sweden 
is to maintain a viable domestic arms industry it must tolerate arms exports 
which may undermine many of its traditional foreign policy objectives. To 
some extent, this dilemma confronts all Western governments. If current 
trends toward conventional disarmament in Europe continue, Western 
defense contractors will find themselves even more dependent on exports to 
the Third World.
V. Illegal Arms Sales and American National Security
If arms smuggling has increased over the past decade, to what extent has it 
affected American national security? Are illegal arms sales essentially benign, 
or do they genuinely undermine our foreign policy objectives?
The most obvious problem with black market weapons is that they are 
used to arm our adversaries. Provided a hostile nation is willing and able to 
pay the price, it can purchase all but the most sensitive conventional weapons 
and virtually any kind of spare part through the black market. Iran is the 
classic example. As we have seen, other adversaries like North Korea and 
Libya also have obtained American-made military equipment through the 
black market. Even more alarming is the possibility that terrorist groups 
could obtain such sophisticated weaponry as surface-to-air missiles, either 
directly through an arms merchant, or indirectly through a patron state like 
Iran or Libya. *%
Black market arms sales also harm American interests by impairing our 
intelligence gathering capabilities. When operating overseas, the American 
military depends on intelligence to accurately assess the technological 
capabilities of hostile forces, But even the best intelligence cannot account for 
arms purchased clandestinely. The less infoimation available about a 
potential enemy, the greater the risk to American servicemen. For example, 
when the U.S. Navy escorted oil tankers in the Persian Gulf it was unable to 
gauge the readiness of Iran's Air Force and air defenses.^? In this case,
37 Laurance, p. 233.
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illegally purchased spare missile parts undermined American naval planning 
and endangered the lives of U.S. servicemen.
The illegal arms market also impairs America's ability to control 
international conflict, a key foreign policy tool. In times of crisis, the United 
States reserves the right to curtail arms salt's to particularly unstable countries 
in order to prevent, or at least contain, conventional wars. In 1983, for 
example, the U. S. government launched "Operation Staunch," a program 
aimed at halting all international arms shipments to Iran. Bv establishing 
this embargo the United States hoped to end the Iran-lraq war. Instead, the 
black market supplied Iran with enough spare parts and new equipment to 
sustain its war effort more than five years after the U.S. announced its 
embargo.
Despite the many shortcomings of Operation Staunch, some analysts insist 
that the illegal arms market has not deprived America of its ability to control 
international conflicts. Writing in 1987, Stephanie Neuman noted that 
because of American pressure, "Iran has been unable to acquire any modern 
major weapons since the beginning of the war." 38 In other words, Operation 
Staunch succeeded by limiting the Gulf war to a relatively low technological 
level of combat. James Uederman credits Operation Staunch for gradually 
squeezing Iran’s sources of supply to a trickle and forcing Iran to negotiate a 
cease-fire in 1988.39 Indeed, the war might have ended sooner if the U.S.
38 Neuman, Stephanie G. "Arms and Superpower Influence: Lessons Prom
Recent Wars." Orbis, Winter 1987, p. 723.
39 Lederman, James. "‘Operation Staunch’ Forced Khomeini s Hand." The
Wall Street Journal, July 22, 1988, p. 18.
government hadn’t violated its own arms embargo during the Iran-Contra 
affair.
Whatever its effects on America s ability to control conflict abroad, the 
illegal arms market clearly damages American military preparedness at 
home, livery piece of equipment stolen from Defense Department 
warehouses and smuggled overseas depletes critical weapons stockpiles. For 
example, the San Diego smuggling ring s theft of F-14 spare parts severely 
curtailed the number of F-14 training exercises. According to federal 
prosecutors, during one twelve-month period no fewer than 328 F-14 
missions were scrubbed due to lack of computer and navigational 
equipment.40 The Reagan administration s clandestine sale of Hawk missile 
components to Iran in 1986 temporarily wiped out 15 types of spare parts and 
nearly eliminated 46 more.41 These two instances highlight the extent to 
which illegal arms sales can jeopardize the readiness of America s armed 
forces.
Finally, illegal arms harm American security by disrupting our diplomatic 
relations with the countries involved. In 1988, the State Department asked 
Qatar, a tiny Persian Gulf principality, to return 12 Stinger missiles it had 
obtained on the black market. Qatar refused, prompting the Senate 
Appropriations Committee to freeze U.S. military relations with that country 
until it returned the missiles.42 Another diplomatic row erupted after arms
40 Schachter, Jim. "Figure in Navy Arms Thefts Seeks Plea Change." The 
Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1986, p. 21.
41 Tumulty, Karen. "Arms Sales to Iran Depleted Spare Parts.” The Los 
Angeles Times, October 14, 1987, p. 4.
42 Sciolino, Elaine. "Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand For Return of Illicit 
Stingers." The New York Times, June 28, 1988, p. 2.
traffickers smuggled 82 Hughes helicopters into North Korea. Seoul's 
ambassador to the United States demanded compensation for any damage 
done to South Korea's strategic position.^
Considering the events of the past decade, illegal arms sales have posed 
substantial-though bv no means insurmountable-obstacles to the conduct of 
American foreign policy.
43 Lachica, Eduardo. "Seoul Envoy Seeks Compensation for Helicopters." 
The Wall Street journal, April 18, 1985, p. 34.
VI. Previous Efforts At Limiting ihe Illegal Arms Trade
When examining earlier attempts at controlling the illegal arms trade, one 
must hear in mind that black market sales were not considered a major 
foreign policy problem until quite recently. Consequently, most domestic 
legislation relates to the control of American weapons transfers in general, 
not to the prevention of black market transactions. In fact, the urge to 
regulate American arms exports is itself so recent that the first 
comprehensive legislation passed less than 15 years ago.
The primary mechanism passed by Congress to regulate the sale of 
American weapons is the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Like other post- 
Vietnam legislation, it restricts the foreign policy prerogatives of the 
executive branch and expands the scope for congressional oversight. The act 
begins with the rather vague precondition that government arms sales shall 
be approved only 'When they are consistent with the foreign policy interests 
of the United States."44 it goes on to outline lengthy procurement and 
payment procedures as well as provisions mandating congressional 
notification of all government arms sales above $25 million.
The Arms Export Control Act suffered from two major flaws. First, it 
included a number of concessions to the executive branch in the form of 
loopholes which allowed the President to initiate arms sales without 
informing Congress, as long as he considered them “vital’’ to the national 
interest. Congressional leaders claimed that President Reagan took advantage
44 u.S. Government Printing Office. The Arms Export Control Act.
Washington, D.C., August 25,1976, p. 2.
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of such loopholes during the Iran-contra affair. Second, and most 
importantly, the act applied only to U S. government sales, not to private 
transactions. When Congress passed the act in 1976, bilateral, govcrnment-to- 
government sales still dominated the international arms market. However, 
the rise of private arms dealers over the past fifteen years effectively undercut 
many of the original goals of the legislation.
In the wake of the Iran-contra affair, Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) and 
Rep. Henry Hyde (R-U.) jointly offered a number of amendments to the Arms 
Kxport Control Act. One amendment specifically prohibits government arms 
sales to states which sponsor international terrorism. It also extends this ban 
to any commercial transactions involving U.S. citizens and corporations, 
provided there is any "reason to know*' the weapons will reach a terrorist 
state.45 Violators are subject to fines of up to SI million and prison terms of 
up to 10 years.
Additional amendments close certain loopholes in the original act. One of 
them permits the President to waive the provisions of the act "for reasons of 
national security,” provided he informs Congress 15 days prior to doing so. In 
“exceptional circumstances when time is of the essence,” the President can 
waive the 15-day requirement, as long as he informs Congress of his actions 
24 hours in advance. A further amendment requires congressional 
notification any time a country which purchases weapons from the U.S. 
government is given permission to sell them to a third party. Despite some
45 U.S. Government Printing Office. Antiterrorism Policy ami Anns f Apart 
Controls: Hearing and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on H.R. 3651. Washington, D. C., March 17,1988, and April 19, 1988, pp 78- 
81.
objections from the administration, the Berman-1 Ivde amendments passed 
the House by a voice vote on May 24, 1988, with overwhelming bipartisan 
support.
International agreements specifically to prevent illegal arms sales are 
virtually nonexistent. A few attempts have been made to restrain the 
international arms trade, but even these efforts have been only partially 
effective.
From 1977 to 1978 the United States and the Soviet Union conducted a 
series of Conventional Arms Transfer Talks (CATT) in conjunction with 
other bilateral arms control negotiations. The two sides reached some 
preliminary agreements on terminology and other technical criteria, but they 
accomplished little else.47 The negotiations eventually collapsed, partly 
because the superpowers could not agree on which regions of the Third 
World the proposed treaty would cover. Even if the CAT negotiations had 
succeeded, it seems unlikely that they would have checked the rise of black 
market arms sales in the 1980s.
The only successful international attempt at regulating the sale of 
armaments is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) established in 
1987. The purpose of this multilateral Western agreement is to prevent the 
proliferation of missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads. The MTCR 
broke new ground in terms of coordinated, multinational action, but it is by
46 Felton, John. ’’House Votes to Tighten Arms-Sale Law." Congressional 
Quarterly, May 28,1988, p. 1462.
47 Hammond, Paul Y., et al. The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decisionmaking 
for Arms Sales. Cambridge, MA: Delgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 
Inc, 1983, pp 175-177.
no means perfect. For example, the agreement leaves enforcement 
mechanisms up to the individual signatories rather than outlining joint 
procedures. Moreover, the accord applies only to the United States and the 
six Western nations who signed it.48
48 Klare, Winter 1988-1989, p. 162.
VII. What Further Steps May Be Taken 
to Control Illegal Arms Sales?
In the wake of the Iran-contra affair, Congressmen Berman and Hyde 
updated the Arms Export Control Act to meet the needs of the late Ic>8t)s and 
beyond. Thanks to their efforts, loopholes in American laws no longer 
provide a refuge for arms traffickers. Accordingly, future domestic initiatives 
to combat illegal arms sales should focus primarily on prevention and better 
enforcement of existing controls, not new legislation
Professor Edward ). I .a lira nee of the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, suggests that United States government should begin by 
redefining its declaratory policy on arms sales. In his opinion, such formal 
policy statements are not mere words, but do indeed influence the attitudes of 
arms manufacturers and the bureaucrats who regulate them l.aurance 
believes that future U S. policy should place renewed emphasis on the control 
of arms sales. However, he insists that control” should be defined not in 
terms of fewer overall sales, but rather in terms of more careful evaluation of
arms transfers on a case bv case basis &*
Of course, such individualized scrutiny depends upon the adequate 
staffing of enforcement agencies like the State Department s Office of 
Munitions Control (OMC). While the Commerce Department regulates 
export license applications for the sale of dual-use items, the OMC must 
evaluate applications for all commercial arms sales. Unfortunately, the 
increased volume of applications over the past 15 years has overwhelmed the
Laurance, p. 236.
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OMCs tiny staff. According to a 1987 General Accounting Office report, the 
OMCs 30 employees evaluated over 49,000 applications during fiscal 1986, 
rejecting only two percent of them.50 jn testimony before the Senate 
Government Affairs Committee, the director of the OMC admitted that his 
staff had to process applications so quickly that they didn't even have time to 
determine if a potential exporter had a criminal record.51
Increased staffing would improve the OMC s performance. I lowever, the 
General Accounting Office concluded that much of the OMC s caseload could 
be automated, provided enough money is allocated to purchase the requisite 
computer system. Laurance suggests that the OMC be reorganized along the 
lines of the Defense Technology Security Agency.52 Since its establishment in 
1981, this Defense Department agency has successfully thwarted the export of 
strategic technology.
In general, the process of preventing illegal arms exports suffers from a 
lack of inter-governmental coordination. With the workload divided 
between various agencies, cooperation ought to be routine. Yet, the OMC 
failed to check the names of its applicants against lists of dubious exporters 
prepared by the Commerce Department, the Customs Service, and the 
Pentagon. For example, while OMC staffers knew of fewer than 30
50 U.S. General Accounting Office. Licensing Reviews for Exporting Military 
Items Can Be Improved. Report No. NS1 AD-87-211, September, 1987, p. 9.
51 Thornton, Mary. "Weapon Exporters Licensed Routinely." The 
Washington Post, February 21, 1989, p. 10.
52 Laurance, p. 236.
questionable companies, the Detense Department maintained listings of 
hundreds of such firms.N*
Finally, the Department of Defense must plug the holes in its inventory 
management system which facilitate the scandalous pilfering of equipment 
from US. military warehouses. The current system depends on l%0s-era 
software that is older than many of the soldiers who use it. A new computer 
system should eliminate most of the sloppy bookkeeping, but it will not be 
complete until 1991 at the earliest.54 In addition, the armed forces must 
improve the quality of their support personnel. Congressional investigators 
were shocked to discover that 21 inventory control workers at a Norfolk, 
Virginia, naval depot could neither read nor write.55 Obviously, the 
Pentagon needs to screen potential security personnel more carefully and 
should consider increasing their pay to make them less susceptible to bribery.
Analysts agree that even the best domestic reforms will not succeed unless 
they are reinforced by international efforts to curb the illegal arms trade. 
Michael Klare suggests a revival of the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks as 
a starling point for limiting all international arms transfers. Klare insists that 
the CATT process must be expanded to include all major arms exporters. 56 
However, in light of recent trends toward disarmament in the developed 
world, many Western defense contractors may find themselves increasingly 
dependent on sales to developing countries. Nations like Britain and France,
53 Goshko, John M. "Arms-Export Controls Called Dangerously Loose." The 
Washington Post, September 11, 1987, p. 23.
5^ Shaw and Bunting, p. 20.
55 Shaw, Gaylord. "Navy Thefts Spark Fear for National Security. The Los 
Angeles Times, July 17, 1985, p. 19.
56 Klare, Winter 1988-1989, p. 161.
whose economies depend partly on military exports, may very well reject any 
attempts to impose international controls on the arms trade.
A more realistic approach would be to negotiate international prohibitions 
on the production and sale of particularly offensive or destabilizing weapons. 
Some obvious candidates for global bans include cluster bombs as well as 
chemical and biological weapons. Most arms-exporting nations and most 
defense contractors would accept such an approach. There is, of course, a 
danger that multi-national bans or embargoes on such weapons would only 
serve to increase the rewards for smugglers willing to trade them on the black 
market.
Another option would be to expand the Missile Technology Control 
Regime to include the Soviet Union and other key missile producers. In the 
fall of 1988, U S. and Soviet diplomats held their first in-depth discussions on 
reducing ballistic missile exports to the Third World. While the two 
superpowers reached no agreements, they did identify common interests in 
preventing the proliferation of long-rang missiles capable of carrying nuclear 
payloads.57 Reaching the same consensus with Third World missile 
exporters, like the People’s Republic of China, will be far more difficult.
Some developing nations will perceive an expanded MTCR to be just as 
discriminatory as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the meantime, the 
current MTCR signatories should consider joint verification and enforcement 
procedures to strengthen the regime.
57 Gordon, Michael R. "U.S. and Soviets Discuss Curbing Missile l-xports. 
The Neiv York Times, September 27, 1988, p. 1 and 14.
Perhaps the best solution to the illegal arms trade is to attack the problem 
directly. Michael Klare has proposed that the world's largest arms exporters 
jointly establish a black market arms transfers control regime, based on the 
MTCR model. The regime should establish uniform procedures for 
regulating arms exports, as well as strict *vcurity standards for arms storage 
facilities.^ Standardized export regulations will prevent arms smugglers 
from taking advantage disparate national laws, as Iranian agents did when 
operating between London and the United States.
In addition, the participants in a black market control regime could pool 
their resources for joint intelligence and police operations aimed at 
apprehending and convicting arms traffickers. Cooperative efforts of this 
nature already exist to combat terrorists and narcotics dealers. Sustained 
international efforts may not eliminate arms smuggling, but thev should 
reduce its frequency to a more acceptable level. Such a goal is in the common 
interests of both superpowers and all other major arms producers.
58 Klare, Winter 1988-1989, p. 163.
VIIt What Conclusions Can Be Drawn About 
the Black Market in American Arms?
Throughout the 1980s illegal arms sales flourished to a greater extent than 
ever before. During this time, a half dozen contemporaneous conflicts, from 
the Persian Gulf to Central America, conspired to fuel the smugglers' trade.
In addition to these transitory events, institutional forces also magnified the 
black market: the decline of the bilateral arms trade; the increasing demand 
for offsets; the rise of private arms dealers; and the intermingling of arms 
trafficking with the drug trade. All of these long-term trends suggest that the 
potential for gunrunning remains strong, even if the immediate demand for 
black-market arms has waned.
Judging from the experience of the past decade, illegal arms sales do pose 
significant threats to American security interests. In addition to arming our 
adversaries, the black market impairs our intelligence-gathering capabilities 
and compromises our ability to control conflict in the rest of the world by 
regulating the flow of armaments. The pilfering of arms and spare parts from
Pentagon warehouses depletes U.S. stockpiles, thereby jeopardizing the 
readiness of our armed forces. Finally, the illegal sale of American-made 
weapons needlessly strains our diplomatic ties with the nations involved. 
The problems associated with black market arms are not acute, but they do 
merit our attention to prevent them from raging out of control in the future.
Relatively modest improvements in domestic oversight and 
administration will reduce the volume of illegal, rms transactions. Again, 
the emphasis should be on enforcing the regulations already in place, rather
3 6
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than on drafting new legislation. For example, the State Department's Office 
of Munitions Control would benefit from increased staffing, automation, and 
better coordination with other export-control agencies. New computer 
technology and better screening of security personnel should permit the 
Department of Defense to improve its miserable standards of bookkeeping 
and supply management. If nothing else, experience has taught military 
supply officers to guard against spare parts theft.
Of course, the United States cannot combat the illegal arms trade without
international assistance. Yet, the prospects for multilateral action remain 
uncertain. Most developed nations will agree that containing the 
proliferation of destabilizing missiles or nuclear technology is in the common 
interest of all concerned. But what about the sale of tanks, artillery, fighter
aircraft, and other staples of the international arms trade? Efforts to control 
black market arms sales will not succeed if they are perceived as a threat to 
heretofore legitimate arms transfers.
On the other hand, the potential for international cooperation has never 
been greater. In the immediate future, a number of global security issues,
from nuclear proliferation to chemical weapons and the drug trade, will 
increasingly dominate the foreign relations of the developed world. 
American diplomats should not hesitate to link progress in combatting these 
international scourges with efforts to control the illegal arms trade. In doing 
so, they can take advantage of the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy to 
build a post-Cold War relationship with the U.S.S.R. based upon parallel 
security interests.
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IX. Appendix A 
Illegal Arms Exports 1982-1988*
FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 Total
Number of Seizures 768 1,444 159 750 802 1,044 361 6,625
Value of Seizures 
(in millions of U,S,$)
m m * .->->.6 86.3 88.6 74.8 51.6 75.9 31.1 460.9
Detentions 2,481 3,620 2,329 947 1,062 (NA) (\A ) 10,439
Arrests 198 n o 121 184 116 96 69 891
Indictments 17i 63 178 425 158 105 101 1,201
Convictions 134 80 92 67 117 45 60 595
Note: FY stands for fiscal year. Data for 1988 include* only the first six 
months.
•Source: U.S. Customs Service data published in "The New C'.unrunning" by 
Edward J. Laurance, p. 228.
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Significant Export Control Cases 1 >81-1988*
X. Appendix B
Types of Cases 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total
Small Arms 1 2 2 4 5 2 3 1 20
Embargo 1 1 1 1 4 0 1 0 9
Technology 5 4 10 22 10 6 9 1 67
Support 0 4 7 16 9 7 6 54
Major Weapon s 1 1 3 2
mm5 6 9 1 26
Total Cases 8 12 21 36 40 23 27 9 176
•Source: Data from Export Control Enforcement Unit, Internal Security 
Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice as printed in "The 
New Cunrunning" by Edward J. Laurance, p. 228.
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